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October 17, 2006
Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp. Court of Appeals of New York
Guiding Principle:
Medical or scientific expert testimony on causation in a toxic tort case must be based on more than general, subjective and conclusory assertions.
Summary of Facts:
The plaintiff, Eric Parker, sued Mobil Oil Corporation, claiming that exposure to benzene in gasoline caused him to develop acute myelogenous leukemia. Parker had worked as a gasoline station attendant for 17 years and had been exposed to benzene through inhalation of gasoline fumes and through dermal contact with gasoline. Benzene is a known carcinogen.
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March 16, 2007
Kish v. Graham, M.D. Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Medical or scientific expert testimony on causation in a toxic tort case must be based on more than general, subjective and conclusory assertions.
Summary of Facts:
The plaintiff, Eric Parker, sued Mobil Oil Corporation, claiming that exposure to benzene in gasoline caused him to develop acute myelogenous leukemia. Parker had worked as a gasoline station attendant for 17 years and had been exposed to benzene through inhalation of gasoline fumes and through dermal contact with gasoline. Benzene is a known carcinogen.
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Before the completion of discovery in the case, Mobil Oil moved to preclude Parker's expert testimony on the issue of medical causation. Mobil Oil argued that the expert testimony was scientifically unreliable. Mobil Oil submitted the expert affidavits of an epidemiologist and toxicologist to establish that there was no causal relationship between the plaintiff's exposure to benzene in gasoline and his leukemia.
In opposition to Mobil's motion, Parker submitted the reports of two experts: the first, a board-certified physician in occupational medicine and fellow of the American College of Epidemiology, and the second, a physician who was an expert in toxicology and epidemiology.
The first of plaintiff's medical experts noted that several studies had found an increased risk of leukemia in petroleum refinery workers and concluded that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty Parker contracted his leukemia as a result of his occupational exposure to benzene. The second expert stated that Parker had greater levels of exposure to benzene than the workers in the refinery studies. Neither of Parker's experts quantified his exposure to benzene from gasoline. Moreover, neither expert cited any studies linking acute myelogenous leukemia to exposure in gasoline.
Ruling of the Court:
The Court of Appeals, the highest court in the New York Court system, precluded plaintiff's experts from rendering their medical and/or scientific opinions and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
Reasoning:
The plaintiff's experts, although highly qualified in their respective fields, failed to demonstrate that exposure to benzene as a component of gasoline caused Parker's leukemia. The general, subjective and conclusory assertion that Parker had far more exposure to benzene than the refinery workers in the epidemiological studies was insufficient to establish causation. It neither stated the level of the refinery workers' exposure, nor specified how Parker's exposure exceeded it. Thus, the experts' opinions lacked epidemiologic evidence to support the plaintiff's claim. The experts failed to establish the relationship between exposure to benzene as a component of gasoline and Parker's leukemia.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision , visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.
In opposition to Mobil's motion, Parker submitted the reports of two experts: the first, a board-certified physician in occupational medicine and fellow of the American College of Epidemiology, and the second, a physician who was an expert in toxicology and epidemiology.
The first of plaintiff's medical experts noted that several studies had found an increased risk of leukemia in petroleum refinery workers and concluded that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty Parker contracted his leukemia as a result of his occupational exposure to benzene. The second expert stated that Parker had greater levels of exposure to benzene than the workers in the refinery studies. Neither of Parker's experts quantified his exposure to benzene from gasoline. Moreover, neither expert cited any studies linking acute myelogenous leukemia to exposure in gasoline.
Ruling of the Court:
The Court of Appeals, the highest court in the New York Court system, precluded plaintiff's experts from rendering their medical and/or scientific opinions and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
Reasoning:
The plaintiff's experts, although highly qualified in their respective fields, failed to demonstrate that exposure to benzene as a component of gasoline caused Parker's leukemia. The general, subjective and conclusory assertion that Parker had far more exposure to benzene than the refinery workers in the epidemiological studies was insufficient to establish causation. It neither stated the level of the refinery workers' exposure, nor specified how Parker's exposure exceeded it. Thus, the experts' opinions lacked epidemiologic evidence to support the plaintiff's claim. The experts failed to establish the relationship between exposure to benzene as a component of gasoline and Parker's leukemia.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision , visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.
Guiding Principle:
A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action cannot be required to provide a HIPAA-compliant authorization allowing the defendants' attorneys to conduct a private interview with the plaintiff's non-party treating physicians.
Summary of Facts:
The plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice and wrongful death action alleging that the defendant physicians failed to diagnose and treat the deceased's perineal necrotizing faciitis.
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July 26, 2007
Brown v. Bauman, M.D. Appellate Division, First Department
A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action cannot be required to provide a HIPAA-compliant authorization allowing the defendants' attorneys to conduct a private interview with the plaintiff's non-party treating physicians.
Summary of Facts:
The plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice and wrongful death action alleging that the defendant physicians failed to diagnose and treat the deceased's perineal necrotizing faciitis.
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As the defendants' attorneys were preparing for the upcoming trial, they requested that the plaintiff (the administrator of the deceased's estate) provide HIPAA-compliant authorizations permitting the defense attorneys to interview the deceased's non-party treating physicians. The plaintiff refused to provide the authorizations. The lower court ordered the plaintiff to provide the authorizations and the plaintiff appealed.
Ruling of the Court:
A divided Appellate Division (two judges dissented), reversed and held that such private interviews with a plaintiff's non-party treating physicians were not authorized under the law.
Reasoning:
Prior pre-HIPAA case law permitted defense counsel to conduct private interviews with a patient's treating physicians once the case was certified as ready for trial. The practice of conducting private interviews of treating physicians was used primarily in medical malpractice litigation. Recently, however, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in a case entitled Arons v. Jutkowitz, held that the courts may not compel patients to authorize such private interviews. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department in Kish v. Graham agreed and held that such interviews are prohibited. The court held that proper method for obtaining information from a treating physician is to conduct a formal deposition of the treating physician.
The two dissenting judges argued that a party waives the physician-patient privilege by bringing a personal injury action and that fairness dictates that both the patient-plaintiff and the defendant physicians should have equal access to information held by a treating physician. Requiring the defendant physicians to conduct more expensive, inconvenient, and burdensome depositions to gather information from treating physicians provides an unfair advantage to plaintiffs over defendants, argued the dissenters. The dissenters noted that requiring a treating physician to submit to depositions or written questions/interrogatories could significantly impact the treating physician's availability to practice medicine. The dissenting judges warned, "Instead of communicating with an attorney during a 10-minute telephone call, a [treating] physician could be required to attend a four-hour deposition or to provide a time-consuming response to detailed and lengthy interrogatories."
Editor's Note:
The practical effect of the court's decision on medical providers, and whether the dissenting judges' dire predictions become reality, remains to be seen.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision , visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.
Ruling of the Court:
A divided Appellate Division (two judges dissented), reversed and held that such private interviews with a plaintiff's non-party treating physicians were not authorized under the law.
Reasoning:
Prior pre-HIPAA case law permitted defense counsel to conduct private interviews with a patient's treating physicians once the case was certified as ready for trial. The practice of conducting private interviews of treating physicians was used primarily in medical malpractice litigation. Recently, however, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in a case entitled Arons v. Jutkowitz, held that the courts may not compel patients to authorize such private interviews. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department in Kish v. Graham agreed and held that such interviews are prohibited. The court held that proper method for obtaining information from a treating physician is to conduct a formal deposition of the treating physician.
The two dissenting judges argued that a party waives the physician-patient privilege by bringing a personal injury action and that fairness dictates that both the patient-plaintiff and the defendant physicians should have equal access to information held by a treating physician. Requiring the defendant physicians to conduct more expensive, inconvenient, and burdensome depositions to gather information from treating physicians provides an unfair advantage to plaintiffs over defendants, argued the dissenters. The dissenters noted that requiring a treating physician to submit to depositions or written questions/interrogatories could significantly impact the treating physician's availability to practice medicine. The dissenting judges warned, "Instead of communicating with an attorney during a 10-minute telephone call, a [treating] physician could be required to attend a four-hour deposition or to provide a time-consuming response to detailed and lengthy interrogatories."
Editor's Note:
The practical effect of the court's decision on medical providers, and whether the dissenting judges' dire predictions become reality, remains to be seen.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision , visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.
Guiding Principle:
A physician who is unable to care for his or her patient does not depart from the standard of care so long as he or she arranges to transfer the care of the patient to another well-qualified physician.
Summary of Facts:
The patient commenced a medical malpractice action against the defendant solo practitioner and board-certified obstetrician. The obstetrician was unexpectedly late in proceeding from his home to the hospital to attend his patient's labor and delivery.
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A physician who is unable to care for his or her patient does not depart from the standard of care so long as he or she arranges to transfer the care of the patient to another well-qualified physician.
Summary of Facts:
The patient commenced a medical malpractice action against the defendant solo practitioner and board-certified obstetrician. The obstetrician was unexpectedly late in proceeding from his home to the hospital to attend his patient's labor and delivery.
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He confirmed by telephone that an on-call attending obstetrician and the chief obstetrical resident physician were caring for the patient pending his arrival. The defendant physician arrived at the hospital shortly after the birth, at which time the attending and resident physicians were repairing a perineal laceration sustained by the patient during the delivery. Following the delivery, the patient experienced severe urinary and fecal incontinence. The patient argued that had the defendant obstetrician been present, his experience might have led him to perform an episiotomy, which would have prevented the perineal tear. She argued that the defendant obstetrician was negligent in leaving the delivery to an inexperienced resident, who performed a faulty repair of the laceration.
Ruling of the Court:
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant obstetrician.
Reasoning:
Although the defendant obstetrician was not available for the delivery, he properly arranged for coverage by competent medical personnel in his absence. Thus, there was no connection between the defendant obstetrician's arrangement of medical coverage and the alleged injuries.
What is more, the plaintiff's claims against the defendant obstetrician rested on speculative and specious assumptions that the plaintiff had sustained a third- or fourth-degree tear, that a proper examination would have revealed it, that such a laceration would have been amenable to surgical repair, and that the repair would have been successful. The court noted that such "hindsight reasoning" was insufficient to prove the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff's claims were not supported by the notations in the hospital record or the testimony of the attending and resident obstetricians. It was speculative of the plaintiff's expert to infer that the laceration would have been successfully repaired had the defendant obstetrician made a proper examination and diagnosis.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision , visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.
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Ruling of the Court:
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant obstetrician.
Reasoning:
Although the defendant obstetrician was not available for the delivery, he properly arranged for coverage by competent medical personnel in his absence. Thus, there was no connection between the defendant obstetrician's arrangement of medical coverage and the alleged injuries.
What is more, the plaintiff's claims against the defendant obstetrician rested on speculative and specious assumptions that the plaintiff had sustained a third- or fourth-degree tear, that a proper examination would have revealed it, that such a laceration would have been amenable to surgical repair, and that the repair would have been successful. The court noted that such "hindsight reasoning" was insufficient to prove the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff's claims were not supported by the notations in the hospital record or the testimony of the attending and resident obstetricians. It was speculative of the plaintiff's expert to infer that the laceration would have been successfully repaired had the defendant obstetrician made a proper examination and diagnosis.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision , visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.