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May 2, 2006
Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss Court of Appeals
Guiding Principle:
The defendant anesthesiologist was allowed to testify in a medical malpractice action that he relied on guidelines published by the American Heart Association in association with the American College of Cardiology in deciding not to send the patient for a preoperative cardiac work-up.
Summary of Facts:
Marie Hinlicky, age 71, underwent an endarterectomy to remove plaque in her carotid artery. Though her surgery was completed successfully, she suffered a heart attack and died 25 days later. Ms. Hinlicky's estate brought a medical malpractice action, alleging negligence on the part of the patient's anesthesiologist, among others.
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June 13, 2006
Monir v. Khandakar Appellate Division Second Department
The defendant anesthesiologist was allowed to testify in a medical malpractice action that he relied on guidelines published by the American Heart Association in association with the American College of Cardiology in deciding not to send the patient for a preoperative cardiac work-up.
Summary of Facts:
Marie Hinlicky, age 71, underwent an endarterectomy to remove plaque in her carotid artery. Though her surgery was completed successfully, she suffered a heart attack and died 25 days later. Ms. Hinlicky's estate brought a medical malpractice action, alleging negligence on the part of the patient's anesthesiologist, among others.
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The case went to trial, where the proof showed the patient had significant blockage of her carotid arteries. Ms. Hinlicky's vascular surgeon recommended an endarterectomy. The defendant anesthesiologist reviewed Ms. Hinlicky's medical history, her chart, laboratory results, EKGs from 1995 and 1996, and two pre-operative nursing assessments. He also examined and interviewed her.
He decided not to send her for a preoperative cardiac evaluation based on the type of surgery involved, her history and her functional capacity.
The anesthesiologist testified that he had followed a set of clinical guidelines (algorithm) published in 1996 by the American Heart Association in association with the American College of Cardiology. He incorporated the guidelines into his practice shortly after they were published, because they helped physicians decide "which patient needs to go for a cardiac evaluation . . . and which patient can proceed to the operating room."
The anesthesiologist was permitted to testify that the algorithm was a flow diagram which helped anesthesiologists decide which patients to send to the operating room and which patients to send to a cardiologist. He testified that the algorithm was also available to surgeons, internists and family physicians, and he would consult it for patients like Ms. Hinlicky who were at risk for coronary artery disease to determine the need for cardiac evaluation. The jury unanimously found in favor of the defendants, concluding that they were not negligent in failing to secure a pre-operative cardiac clearance.
Ruling of the Court:
The Court of Appeals, the highest court in the New York State system, concluded that in this case, the algorithm was properly admitted into evidence because it illustrated the anesthesiologist's decision-making methodology in clearing Mrs. Hinlicky for surgery.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision, visit the Court of Appeals' website at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps.
The anesthesiologist testified that he had followed a set of clinical guidelines (algorithm) published in 1996 by the American Heart Association in association with the American College of Cardiology. He incorporated the guidelines into his practice shortly after they were published, because they helped physicians decide "which patient needs to go for a cardiac evaluation . . . and which patient can proceed to the operating room."
The anesthesiologist was permitted to testify that the algorithm was a flow diagram which helped anesthesiologists decide which patients to send to the operating room and which patients to send to a cardiologist. He testified that the algorithm was also available to surgeons, internists and family physicians, and he would consult it for patients like Ms. Hinlicky who were at risk for coronary artery disease to determine the need for cardiac evaluation. The jury unanimously found in favor of the defendants, concluding that they were not negligent in failing to secure a pre-operative cardiac clearance.
Ruling of the Court:
The Court of Appeals, the highest court in the New York State system, concluded that in this case, the algorithm was properly admitted into evidence because it illustrated the anesthesiologist's decision-making methodology in clearing Mrs. Hinlicky for surgery.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision, visit the Court of Appeals' website at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps.
Guiding Principle:
Medical professionals who practice together may be held liable for each other's actions. If that is the case, a timely lawsuit against one professional may subject another to suit, even after the statute of limitations has expired.
Summary of Facts:
The patient was treated at various times between August 2000 and November 2000 by husband and wife dentists. The wife (dentist A) and husband (dentist B) both practiced in the same office, counseled the patient on possible treatment options, and performed work on the patient's teeth.
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July 13, 2006
Anderson v. Beth Israel Medical Center Appellate Division First Department
Medical professionals who practice together may be held liable for each other's actions. If that is the case, a timely lawsuit against one professional may subject another to suit, even after the statute of limitations has expired.
Summary of Facts:
The patient was treated at various times between August 2000 and November 2000 by husband and wife dentists. The wife (dentist A) and husband (dentist B) both practiced in the same office, counseled the patient on possible treatment options, and performed work on the patient's teeth.
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Dentist B's treatment of the patient stopped after September 2000. Dentist A treated the patient until November 2000. In October 2000, dentists A and B incorporated their practice by forming a professional corporation.
The patient began a timely lawsuit against dentist A alone. After the statute of limitations expired, the patient sought to add dentist B and the professional corporation as additional defendants. The question was whether dentist B and the corporation could be belatedly brought into the lawsuit as defendants after the expiration of the statute of limitations period.
Ruling of the Court:
The patient could not bring a late claim against dentist B because dentists A and B were not liable for each other's professional acts. The patient could, however, bring a late claim against the professional corporation because it was vicariously liable for the acts of the dentists.
Reasoning:
If a timely lawsuit is commenced against one physician, another physician may be brought into the lawsuit on an untimely basis if certain conditions are met. One of those conditions is that the physicians are so "united in interest" that one physician is vicariously liable for the other. In that case, the patient may bring the belatedly-sued physician into an existing suit notwithstanding that the statute of limitations against that physician has expired.
In Monir, although both the husband and wife dentists participated in the patient's overall course of treatment, each administered distinct treatments to the patient on different dates over the course of several months. The mere fact that they were married and shared the same office space did not necessarily make them liable for each other's professional acts. Therefore, the husband dentist (dentist B) could not be belatedly brought into the lawsuit.
The result was different, however, as to the professional corporation. Since the corporation could be held vicariously liable for the malpractice of its employees committed within the scope of the corporation's business, the corporation could be belatedly brought into the lawsuit.
Commentary:
This case illustrates issues commonly raised when medical professionals practice together. Your lawyer can explain the differences among the various types of business entities and the legal ramifications of each type of entity.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision, visit the Appellate Division, Second Department's website at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ad2/ or visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.
The patient began a timely lawsuit against dentist A alone. After the statute of limitations expired, the patient sought to add dentist B and the professional corporation as additional defendants. The question was whether dentist B and the corporation could be belatedly brought into the lawsuit as defendants after the expiration of the statute of limitations period.
Ruling of the Court:
The patient could not bring a late claim against dentist B because dentists A and B were not liable for each other's professional acts. The patient could, however, bring a late claim against the professional corporation because it was vicariously liable for the acts of the dentists.
Reasoning:
If a timely lawsuit is commenced against one physician, another physician may be brought into the lawsuit on an untimely basis if certain conditions are met. One of those conditions is that the physicians are so "united in interest" that one physician is vicariously liable for the other. In that case, the patient may bring the belatedly-sued physician into an existing suit notwithstanding that the statute of limitations against that physician has expired.
In Monir, although both the husband and wife dentists participated in the patient's overall course of treatment, each administered distinct treatments to the patient on different dates over the course of several months. The mere fact that they were married and shared the same office space did not necessarily make them liable for each other's professional acts. Therefore, the husband dentist (dentist B) could not be belatedly brought into the lawsuit.
The result was different, however, as to the professional corporation. Since the corporation could be held vicariously liable for the malpractice of its employees committed within the scope of the corporation's business, the corporation could be belatedly brought into the lawsuit.
Commentary:
This case illustrates issues commonly raised when medical professionals practice together. Your lawyer can explain the differences among the various types of business entities and the legal ramifications of each type of entity.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision, visit the Appellate Division, Second Department's website at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ad2/ or visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.
Guiding Principle:
Where a plaintiff flagrantly changes his story and fails to submit expert evidence supporting his claims of medical malpractice, his lawsuit should be dismissed.
Summary of Facts:
The plaintiff had an operation for a sinus condition. After surgery, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a blood clot in his left arm and shoulder.
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Where a plaintiff flagrantly changes his story and fails to submit expert evidence supporting his claims of medical malpractice, his lawsuit should be dismissed.
Summary of Facts:
The plaintiff had an operation for a sinus condition. After surgery, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a blood clot in his left arm and shoulder.
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The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the hospital and the anesthesiologist. He alleged the blood clot had developed as the result of medical malpractice on the part of the anesthesiologist. Among other things, the plaintiff claimed that the anesthesiologist placed a blood pressure cuff on the plaintiff's left arm, which was contraindicated due to the presence of a preexisting peripherally inserted central catheter (PICC) line in the left arm. The plaintiff further claimed that this caused the blood clot to develop.
At their pre-trial depositions, the anesthesiologist and a nurse testified that the blood pressure cuff had been placed on the plaintiff's right arm, not his left arm. The plaintiff, on the other hand, admitted at his deposition that he could not remember whether the blood pressure cuff had been placed on his left arm or the right arm. He testified, "I don't remember exactly what [the anesthesiologist] was doing."
The defendants asked the court to grant summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. In support of their application, the defendants submitted the affidavit of an expert boardcertified anesthesiologist, who stated that the blood pressure cuff had been placed in accordance with standard anesthesia practice and on the plaintiff's right arm.
The plaintiff opposed the defendants' request to dismiss his complaint by submitting an affidavit changing the testimony he had given at his deposition. Now, the plaintiff swore that he distinctly remembered having the blood pressure cuff placed on his left arm prior to surgery. The plaintiff did not explain what it was that suddenly refreshed his memory. Nor did the plaintiff submit an expert affidavit in support of his claims of malpractice.
Ruling of the Court:
The Appellate Division held that the plaintiff's affidavit was a blatant change of his deposition testimony. The defendants therefore had the right to submit a further expert affidavit stating that, even assuming the accuracy of the plaintiff's mysteriously recovered memory, the defendants had not committed any malpractice and could not have caused the plaintiff's injury. The defendants were granted summary judgment and the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed.
Reasoning:
The plaintiff never offered any expert evidence to support his claims.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision , visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.
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At their pre-trial depositions, the anesthesiologist and a nurse testified that the blood pressure cuff had been placed on the plaintiff's right arm, not his left arm. The plaintiff, on the other hand, admitted at his deposition that he could not remember whether the blood pressure cuff had been placed on his left arm or the right arm. He testified, "I don't remember exactly what [the anesthesiologist] was doing."
The defendants asked the court to grant summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. In support of their application, the defendants submitted the affidavit of an expert boardcertified anesthesiologist, who stated that the blood pressure cuff had been placed in accordance with standard anesthesia practice and on the plaintiff's right arm.
The plaintiff opposed the defendants' request to dismiss his complaint by submitting an affidavit changing the testimony he had given at his deposition. Now, the plaintiff swore that he distinctly remembered having the blood pressure cuff placed on his left arm prior to surgery. The plaintiff did not explain what it was that suddenly refreshed his memory. Nor did the plaintiff submit an expert affidavit in support of his claims of malpractice.
Ruling of the Court:
The Appellate Division held that the plaintiff's affidavit was a blatant change of his deposition testimony. The defendants therefore had the right to submit a further expert affidavit stating that, even assuming the accuracy of the plaintiff's mysteriously recovered memory, the defendants had not committed any malpractice and could not have caused the plaintiff's injury. The defendants were granted summary judgment and the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed.
Reasoning:
The plaintiff never offered any expert evidence to support his claims.
This decision of interest is not an official citation, and should not be cited as such, nor is it intended to provide any legal advice. For the full text of the uncorrected decision , visit http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/.